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f r 0m a final Order of the Industrial Commission (the 
"Commission") pursuant to Sections 35-1-82.53, 35-1-86, 63-
4 LI tali Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
T:.u Lo*lowing issue is presented foi z e view: 
Is there substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's finding that Petitioner Hoskings is not 
p e — v . 
1. He fail^u tc establish ::na: jld ::. z be 
rehabilitated? 
2. Based on his capabilities, regular work is 
available to him if he is genuinely seeking work?1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Commission ruled that Petitioner Hoskings is not 
permanently totally disabled under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation laws. It found that Petitioner Hoskings can 
be rehabilitated and that other work is available to him, 
after considering his capabilities and limitations.3 
The determination whether an individual is permanently 
totally disabled is a factual question to be resolved by the 
Commission.4 On review of the Commission's findings of 
fact, this Court will uphold the findings if they are 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the Court.5 
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion. 
1
 The issue of Petitioner Hoskings' permanent partial disability, if 
any, was not before the Commission and is not an issue presented for 
review. 
2R. at 211 through 214. The Commission's Order dated March 3, 1995 is 
attached as Appendix "A". 
3
 R. at 213. 
4
 Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Company. 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 
1986). 
5
 Van Leeuwen v. Industrial Commission. 270 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
6Id. 
2 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE 
This case does not involve the interpretation of a 
statute, ordinance, rule or regulation. Rather, the issue 
presented for review is the Commission's factual 
determination that Petitioner Hoskings is not permanently 
totally disabled under the Utah Workers7 Compensation laws. 
The following statutes and rules are, however, applicable : 
1. Section 35-1-67 of the Utah Code Ann. (1974 Repl. 
Vol. 4B 1986 Cum. Supp.).7 
2. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the Utah Code Ann.8 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 6, 1986, Petitioner Hoskings, while employed 
by the City, suffered an acute left ankle sprain when he 
inadvertently stepped down from a truck onto a fire hose 
filled with water. 
On September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings voluntarily 
retired from the City Fire Department and started receiving 
his monthly pension under Title 4 9 of the Utah Code Ann. 
Because Petitioner Hoskings had twenty or more years of City 
7
 A copy of Section 35-1-67 of the Utah Code Ann.. (Supp. 1986) is 
attached as Appendix WB". 
8
 A copy of Section 63-46b-16(4) (g) of the Utah Code Ann, is attached as 
Appendix UC". 
3 
service, he also received a retirement incentive in the 
amount of $35,187.92 from the City. 
On April 16, 1990, Petitioner Hoskings filed an 
Application for Hearing with the Commission seeking workers' 
compensation benefits for the injury he sustained in the 
industrial accident on April 6, 1986. Following a hearing 
on January 8, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
referred the matter to a medical panel. 
The medical panel issued a report on May 13, 1992 
stating that Petitioner Hoskings is 11% whole person 
impaired. The medical panel made no reference to permanent 
total disability. 
On August 3, 1992, the ALJ made a tentative finding 
that Petitioner Hoskings is permanently totally disabled as 
a result of a April 6, 1986 industrial accident. 
On August 3, 1992, the ALJ referred the matter to the 
Utah Division of Rehabilitation Services (DRS). The DRS 
concluded that Petitioner Hoskings did not demonstrate the 
physical stamina and endurance to perform sedentary work 
activities and that his limitations are permanent. 
In December 1993, Petitioner Hoskings was evaluated by 
Dr. S. Knorpp. Dr. S. Knorpp stated that Petitioner 
4 
Hoskings was not "by definition disabled or unable to 
perform or engage in any gainful occupation". 
In December 1993, Intracorp performed a vocational 
evaluation on Petitioner Hoskings. In a report dated 
December 24, 1993, Intracorp identified specific jobs 
Petitioner Hoskings can perform. Intracorp further 
determined that Petitioner Hoskings demonstrated the 
capacity to learn and progress within a career field and 
would be successful in formal education training which would 
prepare him for more challenging and higher paying jobs. 
On June 30, 1994, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order awarding permanent total 
disability benefits to Petitioner Hoskings in the amount of 
$85,800. 
On July 26, 1994, the City filed a Motion for Review of 
the ALJ's order. On March 3, 1995, the Commission issued an 
Order finding that Petitioner Hoskings is not permanently 
totally disabled under Section 35-1-67 of the Utah Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1986) because: 
1. Petitioner Hoskings failed to show that he cannot 
be rehabilitated. 
5 
2. There is regular work available to Petitioner 
Hoskings if he is genuinely seeking work. 
On April 3, 1995, Petitioner Hoskings filed, with this 
Court, a Petition for Review of the final order issued by 
the Commission on March 3, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a statement of the relevant facts 
relied on by the Commission: 
1. Petitioner Hoskings was born on December 6, 
1935.9 
2. He graduated from high school in 1954.1 
3. He attended technical college from 1958 through 
1960 and received a degree in electronics. 
4. From 1960 through 1965, he worked as a test 
technician for Sperry Corporation. 
5. In 1965, he worked for Litton Industries as a 
gyrotechnician. 
6. On January 3, 1966, he started his employment with 
the City as a firefighter.1 
9
 R. a t 2 3 2 . 
10
 R. a t 2 3 4 . 
11
 R. a t 150 . 
12
 R. a t 150 . 
13
 R. a t 150 . 
6 
7. He worked for the City from 1966 to September 1, 
1988. 
8. During his career with the City Fire Department, 
he was promoted from a firefighter to a lieutenant and 
eventually to a captain.1 
i 
9. As a fire captain for the City, he supervised and 
coordinated activities of firefighters; inspected the 
buildings and grounds facilities; examined fire trucks and 
equipment for operational safety and efficiency; responded 
to fire alarms; assisted in firefighting; investigated and 
determined the extent of fire location and water sources; 
managed crews in the fire operation; trained subordinates in 
the use of firefighting equipment and techniques; inspected 
commercial establishments for fire code compliance and 
reported safety violations; compiled other reports; 
recommended corrective measures for fire hazards; supervised 
and coordinated activities of fire companies fighting 
multiple alarm fires; wrote and submitted proposals for the 
purchase of new equipment; and prepared recommendations to 
the City's emergency plans.15 
R. at 150. 
R. at 236. 
7 
10. On April 6, 1986, while working for the City, 
Petitioner Hoskings stepped down from a fire truck onto a 
2.5 inch diameter hose filled with water.16 
11. He injured his left ankle as a result of stepping 
on the hose. 
12. On April 7, 1986, his ankle was examined and it 
18 
was determined that he had an acute ankle sprain. 
13. He did not miss any work time with the City as a 
result of the April 6, 1986 accident.1 
14. After the April 6, 1986 accident, he continued to 
perform his regular duties and responsibilities as a captain 
in the City Fire Department.20 
15. On September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings retired 
from the City and commenced receiving his monthly pension as 
provided under Title 4 9 of the Utah Code Ann. 
16. Petitioner Hoskings did not pursue a disability 
retirement under Title 49 of the Utah Code Ann. 
17. Petitioner Hoskings accepted an early retirement 
incentive from the City in the amount of $35,187.92,22 
16
 R. a t 152 . 
17
 R. a t 152 . 
18
 R. a t 152 . 
19
 R. a t 159 . 
20
 R. a t 159 . 
21
 R. a t 154 . 
22
 R. a t 179 . 
18. At the time of his retirement, Petitioner Hoskings 
did not inform the City that his decision to retire was 
related to his ankle injury. 
20. After his retirement in September 1988, Petitioner 
Hoskings developed lung problems and was treated for 
pneumonia and pleural effusion. 
21. He received follow-up care for his lung problems 
at LDS Hospital in December 1988.25 
22. Dr. M. Collins, a pulmonologist at LDS Hospital, 
stated that the lung injury was not related to any on-the-
j ob event.2* 
23. From April 22, 1990 through September 23, 1990, 
Petitioner Hoskings worked at a full-time job with Hamilton 
Stores in West Yellowstone, Wyoming as a fire marshal.27 
24. As a fire marshal in West Yello'wstone, Wyoming, he 
taught fire safety and did fire protection education at 
several stores operated within Yellowstone National Park.28 
25. On April 16, 1990, Petitioner Hoskings filed an 
Application for Hearing with the Commission alleging that he 
R. at 211. 
R. at 394. 
R. at 394. 
R. at 396. 
R. at 156. 
R. at 156. 
9 
was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result 
of his accident on April 6, 1986.29 
26. In his Application for Hearing, Petitioner 
Hoskings claimed that he was entitled to medical expenses, 
permanent partial disability and permanent total 
disability.30 
27. In 1991, Petitioner Hoskings had planned to do 
seasonal work again with Hamilton Stores in West 
Yellowstone, Wyoming, but Hamilton Stores wanted to hire 
someone to work year-round which Petitioner Hoskings would 
not do. 
28. Petitioner Hoskings worked for Hamilton Stores 
from May 6, 1991 through June 14, 1991 to train the person 
who was to take the year-round position.32 
29. A hearing was held on Petitioner Hoskings' claim 
for workers' compensation benefits before an ALJ on January 
8, 1992.33 
30. After the hearing, the ALJ referred the matter to 
a medical panel in March of 1992.34 
29
 R. at 1. The Application for Hearing originally referred to an 
accident on June 4, 1986. It was determined that the June 4, 1986 date 
was in error and that the correct date was April 6, 1986. 
30
 R. a t 1 . 
31
 R. a t 156 . 
32
 R. a t 156 . 
33
 R. a t 149 . 
10 
31. On May 13, 1992, the medical panel submitted its 
report to the ALJ. 
^2. The medical panel found that Petitioner Hoskings' 
foremost orthopedic problem was his calcaneal cuboid 
arthritis in the left ankle. It determined that the origin 
of this condition was industrial with progression of the 
condition having occurred over the years since the 1986 
industrial accident. It concluded that the appropriate 
permanent partial impairment rating would be 11% whole 
person. The medical panel did not mention permanent total 
disability.36 
33. On or about August 1992, the ALJ made a tentative 
finding that Petitioner Hoskings was permanently totally 
disabled as a result of the April 6, 1986 industrial 
accident. 
34. On August 3, 1992, the ALJ referred the case to 
the Division of Rehabilitation Services (DRS) for an 
evaluation.37 
35. The DRS performed a one week work evaluation of 
Petitioner Hoskings in November 1992. 
34
 R. a t 149 . 
35
 R. a t 149 . 
36
 R. a t 157 . 
37
 R. a t 158 . 
11 
36. The DRS concluded that Petitioner Hoskings lacked 
the physical stamina to perform part-time sedentary work.39 
37. The DRS concluded that, based upon the periodic 
self-reports, Petitioner Hoskings' limitations were 
permanent.40 
38. In December 1993, Petitioner Hoskings underwent a 
vocational evaluation performed by Intracorp. 
39. Based on the evaluation, Intracorp concluded the 
following: 
(a) Based on his work experience, education, 
intelligence, age and limitations, there are specific 
jobs Petitioner Hoskings can perform with some 
training. 
(b) Petitioner Hoskings has demonstrated the 
capacity to learn and would be successful in formal 
training in preparation for more challenging and higher 
paying jobs. 
38
 R. a t 159 . 
39
 R. a t 159 . 
40
 R. a t 159 . 
41
 R. a t 160 . 
42
 R. a t 2 3 6 , 2 3 7 , 2 3 8 , 
12 
(c) There is no medical opinion which prohibits 
Petitioner Hoskings from returning to a full-time work 
schedule under appropriate job demand requirements. 
(d) Petitioner Hoskings is viewed as being able 
to benefit from professional services and vocational 
rehabilitation.43 
40. In December, 1993, Dr. S. Knorpp performed a 
medical examination of Petitioner Hoskings and found that he 
was "not by definition disabled or unable to perform or 
44 
engage in gainful occupation". 
41. On June 30, 1994, the ALJ entered her Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding permanent total 
disability benefits to Petitioner Hoskings in the amount of 
$85,800.00.45 
^2. The ALJ specified, in her Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, that the issue before her was 
a claim for permanent total disability.4 
43. On July 26, 1994, the City filed a Motion for 
Review with the Commission. 
R. at 236, 237, 238. 
R. at 226 through 231. 
R. at 148-49. 
R. at 148. 
R. at 191. 
13 
44. On March 3, 1995, the Commission granted the 
City's Motion for Review and ruled that Petitioner Hoskings 
is not entitled to permanent total disability compensation 
within the meaning of Section 35-1-67 of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act because:4 
(a) He can be rehabilitated. The report prepared 
by the DRS made no distinction between sedentary work 
and more strenuous employment. It did not address the 
fact that his employment at Hamilton Stores 
demonstirated an ability to work. It made no reference 
to his intelligence, education, adaptability or wide 
range of prior work experience. In contrast to the 
DRS, the Intracorp report identifies his training, 
experience and abilities. It specifically addresses 
the effects of his ankle injury and other medical 
conditions. It analyzes the foregoing factors and 
concludes that he can be rehabilitated. Intracorp's 
conclusion is corroborated by the fact that he found 
other work at Hamilton Stores and successfully 
performed his employment duties there. The Commission 
R. at 250, 251. 
14 
was persuaded by Intracorp's' objective data and 
subjective analysis. 
(b) There is other work available to Petitioner 
Hoskings. The Intracorp report contains a list and 
discussion of employment opportunities within his 
abilities. 
45. Petitioner Hoskings appealed the Commission's 
decision to this Court on April 3, 1995. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The City will argue that the following is substantial 
evidence supporting the Commission's finding that Petitioner 
Hoskings is not permanently totally disabled. 
A. Petitioner Hoskings missed no work as a result of 
his industrial accident on April 6, 1986. For two years 
after his industrial accident, Petitioner Hoskings continued 
to perform his regular duties and responsibilities as a fire 
captain. 
B. Petitioner Hoskings voluntarily retired from the 
City on September 1, 1988 and accepted an early retirement 
incentive in the amount of $3 5,187.92. At the time of his 
retirement, he did not specify, as a reason for retiring, 
his problems with his left ankle. Since his retirement was 
15 
not substantially motivated by the industrial injury, but 
primarily due to personal and other reasons, the denial of 
permanent total disability was appropriate. 
C. After he retired in 1988, Petitioner Hoskings 
worked as a seasonal fire marshal in West Yellowstone, 
Wyoming without limitations. The fact that he did other 
work after his retirement is relevant evidence that he is 
capable of working. 
D. It was reasonable for the Commission to rely upon 
the report prepared by Intracorp. Intracorp found that 
Petitioner Hoskings can be rehabilitated and that uhe could 
be successful in long term formal training in preparation 
for more challenging and higher paying jobs.'' 
E. Although the medical opinions in the record 
indicate that Petitioner Hoskings may be permanently 
partially disabled, the same medical evidence, including the 
review by the medical panel appointed by the Commission, 
supports a conclusion that Petitioner Hoskings is not 
permanently totally disabled. 
F. There is regular work available to Petitioner 
Hoskings based upon his intelligence, education, 
adaptability, and wide range of prior work experience. A 
16 
vocational evaluation performed by Intracorp specifies 
employment opportunities within Petitioner Hoskings' 
capabilities. Unlike most odd-lot doctrine cases, 
Petitioner Hoskings has transferable skills which make him 
employable despite his physical limitations. 
In regards to Petitioner Hoskings' issue on permanent 
partial disability, the City argues that although Petitioner 
Hoskings initially raised, in his Application for Hearing, 
that he was seeking permanent partial disability benefits, 
further pleadings and proceedings before the ALJ and 
Commission narrowed Petitioner Hoskings' claim to the sole 
issue of permanent total disability benefits. There has 
been no hearing on the issue as to whether Petitioner 
Hoskings is entitled to permanent partial disability 
benefits and, if he is, what those benefits would be. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER 
HOSKINGS IS NOT PERMANENTLY TOTALLY DISABLED 
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN VIEWED 
IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT. 
Petitioner Hoskings claims that he is permanently 
totally disabled as the result of an industrial accident on 
April 6, 1986. On April 6, 1986, Petitioner Hoskings 
17 
sustained an acute left ankle sprain when he stepped down 
from a truck onto a fire hose filled with water. 
He asserts that he is entitled to permanent total 
disability benefits based on the odd lot doctrine. The odd 
lot doctrine allows the Commission to find permanent total 
disability when a relatively small percentage of impairment 
caused by an industrial accident is combined with other 
factors to render a claimant unable to obtain employment.49 
To qualify as a recipient of benefits under the odd lot 
doctrine, an employee must first "prove that he or she can 
no longer peirform the duties required in his or her 
occupation . . . and must establish that he or she cannot be 
rehabilitated". After the employee has shown that 
rehabilitation is not possible, the employer has the 
opportunity to "prove the existence of steady work the 
employee can perform." 50 The work the employer establishes 
is available must take into consideration all relevant 
factors including the employee's education, mental capacity 
and age, as well as physical limitations. 
49
 Zupon v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah App. 1993). 
50
 Id. (emphasis added) . 
18 
The Commission ruled that Petitioner Hoskings failed to 
prove that he cannot be rehabilitated. Further, even if 
Petitioner Hoskings could be rehabilitated, the Commission 
determined that other work is available that Petitioner 
Hoskings can perform. 
A determination whether an individual is 
permanently . . . totally disabled is a factual 
question to be resolved by the Commission and will 
not be set aside by this Court unless there is no 
substantial evidence in the record to support 
• 4 - 5 2 
it. 
The Commission's finding that Petitioner Hoskings is 
not permanently totally disabled is supported by the 
following substantial evidence. 
A. PETITIONER HOSKINGS DID NOT MISS ANY WORK AS A 
RESULT OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND HE PERFORMED THE FULL 
DUTIES OF HIS JOB UNTIL HE RETIRED. 
Petitioner Hoskings did not miss any work as a result 
of the acute left ankle sprain sustained in his industrial 
accident on April 6, 1986. From April 6, 1986, to the date 
of his retirement on September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings 
performed the full duties and responsibilities of his job as 
a captain in the City Fire Department without limitations or 
52
 Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Company, 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 
1986). 
19 
accommodations. At no time did he express to the City that 
he was a risk to himself, co-workers or the public as he 
performed the normal duties of his position. 
The fact that Petitioner Hoskings returned to his 
normal duties following his industrial accident, without 
missing any work time, is relevant evidence in determining 
his ability to perform the duties of his occupation. Not 
only is it relevant evidence, the Utah Supreme Court, in 
Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Company.53 stated that: 
. . . [T]he fact that an employee returns to work 
after an industrial injury creates a "rebuttable 
presumption that the claimant has not sustained 
permanent and total disability".54 
Petitioner Hoskings presented no evidence which would 
rebut the presumption that he has not sustained permanent 
total disability. 
B. PETITIONER HOSKINGS VOLUNTARILY RETIRED FROM HIS 
JOB WITH THE CITY ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1988 AND WAS PAID. IN 
ADDITION TO HIS NORMAL MONTHLY PENSION, A RETIREMENT 
INCENTIVE FROM THE CITY. 
On September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings voluntarily 
retired from the City Fire Department. At the time of his 
Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Company. 748 P.2d 572 (Utah 1987) . 
Id. 
20 
retirement, Petitioner Hoskings never gave, as a reason for 
his retirement, problems with his left ankle which he 
sprained in an industrial accident on April 6, 1986. Since 
he did not miss any work after the industrial accident and 
performed the duties and responsibilities of his position as 
a fire captain, the City treated Petitioner Hoskings' 
retirement as voluntary. 
Commencing September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings 
received his normal monthly pension under Title 49 of the 
Utah Code Ann. Interestingly, he did not apply for a 
disability pension under Title 49 of the Utah Code Ann. In 
addition to the normal pension, the City paid him a 
retirement incentive in the amount of $35,187.82. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Peck v. Eimco Process 
Equipment Company that when "a finding is made and supported 
by evidence that the employee's retirement is not 
substantially motivated by his industrial injury, but is due 
primarily to personal or other reasons, . . . a denial of 
disability benefits [will] be upheld on a basis of voluntary 
retirement. "55 
Id. at 578. 
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It is reasonable for the Commission to conclude that 
Petitioner Hoskings' retirement was not substantially 
motivated by his industrial injury. At the time he retired, 
Petitioner Hoskings made no mention of his left ankle injury 
as a reason for his retirement. He retired and began 
receiving his monthly pension under Title 4 9 of the Utah 
Code Ann. He took advantage of the City's early retirement 
incentive and was paid $35,187.92. The primary reason for 
his retirement was personal and economic. 
The purpose of the workers' compensation law is to 
"secure [employees] . . . against becoming objects of 
charity, by making reasonable compensation for calamities 
incidental to the employment." This compensation is not 
in the form of damages for injury, but in the form of 
payments to compensate for the loss of employability 
resulting from the injury. 
Accordingly, workers' compensation laws should not be 
used to force the public treasury to pay, as an 
afterthought, $85,800.00, for a left ankle injury, years 
after the employee has retired, in addition to a substantial 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). 
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monthly retirement pension and a retirement incentive in 
the amount of $35,187.00. Petitioner Hoskings is not 
employed because he retired, not because he is unemployable 
by virtue of an industrial injury. 
The Commission correctly ruled that Petitioner Hoskings 
should not be paid from the public treasury $85,800.00 for 
permanent total disability in addition to his monthly 
retirement pension and the $35,187.00 incentive. He 
retired. 
^. AFTER HIS RETIREMENT IN 1988, PETITIONER HOSKINGS 
WORKED A FVhh-Tim JOE AS A FIRE MARSHAL IN WEST 
YELLOWSTONE. WYOMING IN 1990 AND 1991. 
Petitioner Hoskings worked as a fire marshal for 
Hamilton Stores from April 22, 1990 to September 23, 1990 
and from May 6, 1991 through June 14, 1991. As part of his 
duties as a fire marshal, he taught safety and fire 
protection at several stores operated within Yellowstone 
National Park. In 1991, Hamilton Stores wanted to make the 
job a year-round position. Petitioner Hoskings did not want 
to work year-round and, therefore, did not work for Hamilton 
Under Section 49-6a-28 (1986) of the Utah Code Ann.. Petitioner 
Hoskings receives, as a monthly retirement pension, 54% of his final 
average monthly salary. 
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Stores thereafter. While employed by Hamilton Stores, he 
fully performed the duties and responsibilities of the job. 
There is no evidence that he would not have been able to do 
the job if he had been willing to work year-round.59 There 
is no evidence that in order for him to perform the job, he 
needed to exhibit "superhuman efforts" or rely on the 
sympathy of friends. 
The fact that Petitioner Hoskings worked, without 
limitation, in another job after his retirement, is relevant 
evidence the Commission reasonably relied on to support its 
decision that he is capable of working and that there is 
dependable work he can do if he wants to work. Since 
Petitioner Hoskings retired, he did not need to work in a 
year-round position. Because he worked after his industrial 
accident, there is a "rebuttable presumption" that he has 
not sustained a permanent total disability.60 He has 
presented no evidence to rebut the presumption. 
Therefore, the fact that Petitioner Hoskings worked 
after he retired supports the Commission's decision that he 
is not permanently totally disabled. 
Facts paragraphs 23, 24, 27 and 28. 
Peck v, Eimco Process Equipment Company, supra. 
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D. ACCORDING TO AN EVALUATION BY INTRACORP, 
PETITIONER HOSKINGS CAN BE REHABILITATED. 
Petitioner Hoskings was referred to Intracorp for a 
vocational evaluation. Based upon his work experience, 
intelligence, age, education and limitations, there are jobs 
Petitioner Hoskings can perform. Further, Intracorp 
determined that Petitioner Hoskings would be successful in 
long-term formal training in preparation for more 
challenging and higher paying jobs. Intracorp concluded 
that there is no medical opinion which prohibits Petitioner 
Hoskings from returning to a full-time work schedule under 
appropriate job demand requirements.61 
It is reasonable for the Commission to accept the 
expert opinion of Intracorp that Petitioner Hoskings can be 
rehabilitated particularly in light of the whole record 
discussed herein. If Petitioner Hoskings wanted to undergo 
training, he could do regular work. Since he can be 
rehabilitated, he is not permanently totally disabled. 
Facts paragraph 39. 
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E. THE MEDICAL OPINIONS IN THE RECORD SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSIONS FTHPINgg, 
Petitioner Hoskings has been treated and evaluated by 
several physicians and specialists. A medical panel, 
appointed by the ALJ, reviewed Petitioner Hoskings' claim. 
There is no medical opinion which states that Petitioner 
Hoskings is prohibited from returning to a full-time work 
schedule or that he cannot be rehabilitated. On the 
contrary, Dr. S. Knorpp concluded that Petitioner Hoskings 
62 
was not permanently totally disabled. The medical 
evidence in the record supports the Commission's 
determination that Petitioner Hoskings is not permanently 
totally disabled. 
F. TflERP IS STEADY WQfrK PETITIONER HQSKINSS CAN 
PERFORM TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION HIS EDUCATION, MENTAL 
CAPACITY AND AGE AS WELL AS PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS. 
The Commission's finding, that there is work available 
to Petitioner Hoskings, is supported by the following 
substantial evidence. 
1. Unlike most odd-lot cases. Petitioner Hoskings has 
transferable skills. The Commission found that there was 
Facts paragraph 40. 
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general work available to Petitioner Hoskings that he could 
perform given his age, experience, education and 
limitations. 
Disability is evaluated, not in the abstract, but in 
terms of the specific individual who has suffered a work 
related injury. Odd lot cases generally involve claimants 
whose adaptability to the new situation created by their 
physical injury is limited by the lack of mental capacity or 
education. A person whose sole stock in trade has been the 
capacity to perform physical movements, and, whose ability 
to make those movements has been impaired by injury, is 
under severe disadvantage in acquiring a dependable new 
means of livelihood.63 
Accordingly, the odd lot cases most often involve 
employees whose work required physical labor. Many of those 
employees were 50 years old or older with moderate or little 
education.64 In Marshall v. Industrial Commission, a case 
relied upon by Petitioner Hoskings to support his claim, the 
worker who was awarded permanent total disability, was a 
coal miner with less than a high school education and had a 
40 year history of heavy labor in the mines. In Peck v. 
63
 Marshall v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
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Eimco Process Equipment Company, another case relied on by 
Petitioner Hoskings, the worker was 63 years old, had no 
formal education beyond high school and worked his entire 
life in heavy manual labor.65 
Petitioner Hoskings, however, is a high school 
graduate. He completed a one year program in electronics at 
Salt Lake City Technical College. He attended Brigham Young 
University for two years majoring in engineering and 
completed approximately two years of general education 
credits while being employed with Sperry Corporation. He 
worked at Sperry Corporation as a test technician. He 
worked for Litton Industries as a gyrotechnician. 
As an employee with the City Fire Department, 
Petitioner Hoskings was promoted from the rank of 
firefighter to lieutenant to captain. His duties and 
responsibilities with the City included supervising and 
coordinating the activities of firefighters assigned to his 
station; performing fire inspections of buildings and 
facilities; examining fire trucks and equipment for 
operational safety and efficiency; responding to fire 
alarms; determining the extent of fire location and water 
65
 Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Company, supra at 575. 
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sources; d i rec t ing crews in the f i r e operat ion; t r a in ing 
subordinates in the use of f i r e f igh t ing equipment and 
techniques; inspecting commercial establishments for 
compliance with f i r e codes; report ing safety v i o l a t i o n s ; 
compiling r epor t s ; recommending measures for f i r e hazards; 
supervising and coordinating a c t i v i t i e s of f i r e companies 
f ight ing mult iple alarm f i r e s ; wri t ing and submitting 
proposals for new equipment; and preparing wr i t ten 
recommendations to the C i ty ' s emergency plans. 6 6 Unlike the 
claimants in Peck and Marshall. Pe t i t ioner Hoskings has 
t ransfe rab le s k i l l s to other occupations.6 7 
Further, a f t e r he r e t i r e d , Pe t i t ione r Hoskings did in 
fact work as a f i r e marshal for Hamilton Stores in West 
Yellowstone, Wyoming. 
Facts paragraphs 1-9. 
7
 Pe t i t i oner Hoskings' evaluations r e f l e c t that he i s i n t e l l i g e n t and 
very capable of learning new tasks . In the DRS report of December 1, 
1992, the vocational evaluator reported t e s t r e s u l t s in the areas of 
academic development, i n t e l l e c t u a l capac i t i e s and apt i tudes . Pe t i t i oner 
Hoskings scored at the Post-High School l e v e l in vocabulary, reading 
comprehension, problem solv ing and mathematics; in the 78 percent i l e on 
the a b i l i t y to quickly think and learn when presented with nonverbal 
i n t e l l e c t u a l tasks , and in the 95+ percent i l e in abstract a b i l i t y and 
the capacity for observation and c lear thinking. R.490-491. The 
evaluator f e l t that Pet i t ioner Hoskings possessed "many personal 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which resul ted in a competent, w e l l - l i k e d supervisor. 
I t appeared that he would experience very l i t t l e , i f any, d i f f i c u l t y in 
a work s e t t i n g , whether in a supervisory or subordinate ro l e ." 
Moreover, he demonstrated "the a b i l i t y to fol low verbal in s t ruc t ions , 
wri t ten in s t ruc t ions , diagrams, demonstrations and models" as well as 
"the a b i l i t y to e f f e c t i v e l y plan and organize h i s work." Accordingly, 
unlike most odd l o t claimants, Pet i t ioner Hoskings can learn to do other 
jobs i f he i s genuinely pursuing other work. (R. at 493-494.) 
29 
It is reasonable for the Commission to conclude that 
Petitioner Hoskings can perform other general work with or 
without training. 
2. Petitioner Hoskings can be trained for challenging 
and higher paying jobs. Based upon a vocational evaluation 
of Petitioner Hoskings, Intracorp determined that he had the 
capacity to learn and progress within his career field and 
would be successful in long-term formal training in 
preparation for more challenging and higher paying jobs. He 
manifested a suitable appearance and demeanor to pursue a 
professional job search and his stable employment history 
could be considered complimentary by prospective employers. 
Petitioner Hoskings had no familial, legal or other personal 
encumbrances affecting employability and he had adequate 
transportation to acquire and maintain employment. With 
respect to physical limitations, no specific medical opinion 
was on file to prohibit Petitioner Hoskings from returning 
to a full-time work schedule under appropriate job demand 
requirements.69 
3. There is work available to Petitioner Hoskings, 
Intracorp identified general work that Petitioner Hoskings 
68
 R. at 238. 
69
 Facts paragraph 39. 
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could perform with limited training based upon his 
intelligence, education, work experience and physical 
limitations. Intracorp never conditioned the general work 
available to him on the sympathy of friends or superhuman 
efforts. 
Admittedly, DRS determined that Petitioner Hoskings was 
permanently disabled. Petitioner Hoskings argues that the 
report prepared by the DRS is a better evaluation than 
Intracorp and asks this Court to re-weigh the DRS evaluation 
against the report prepared by Intracorp. This Court, 
70 
however, does not re-weigh the evidence. Rather, this 
Court will uphold the finding of the Commission if it is 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light 
of the whole record before the Court. It is reasonable for 
the Commission to give more weight to the Intracorp 
evaluation. 
The Intracorp report, viewed in light of Petitioner 
Hoskings7 voluntary retirement, his work history before 
retirement, his seasonal work after retirement and the 
medical opinions in the record, supports the Commission's 
conclusions that there is regular work available to 
Van Leeuwen v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
31 
Petitioner Hoskings and, therefore, he is not permanently 
totally disabled. 
4. There is no requirement that the City become an 
employment agency and find a specific job for Petitioner 
Hoskings. Petitioner Hoskings argues that the City must not 
only prove that there is work of a general character which 
he can perform or a person of his capabilities may be able 
to learn to do; it must also lead him to a specific job 
opportunity. Although the Intracorp report identified work 
that Petitioner Hoskings can, with his capabilities, 
perform, he criticizes the evaluation because it did not 
find him a specific job. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Marshall v. Industrial 
Commission,71 that workers may be found totally disabled if 
they can no longer perform work of the general nature they 
were performing when injured or any other work which persons 
of their capabilities may be able to do or learn to do or 
for which they might be trained. There is no requirement 
that the City must become an employment agency and find a 
specific job for Petitioner Hoskings. The City's burden is 
only to show that there is general work which Petitioner 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
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Hoskings can perform with or without training based upon his 
physical and educational ability, age and experience. If 
Petitioner Hoskings was correct, a finding of permanent 
total disability would result by simply proving that one 
cannot return to his former job, thereby encouraging injured 
employees, rather than seeking rehabilitation, to avoid any 
active effort to secure alternate employment. This is 
counter to all the innumerable projects, governmental, state 
and federal and private, which look towards restoring to the 
injured the opportunity to become useful, meaningful 
citizens and human beings.72 
Job availability should incorporate the answer to two 
questions: (1) Considering the claimants' age, background, 
employment history and experience, what can claimants 
physically and mentally do following their injury; that is, 
what types of jobs are they capable of performing or capable 
of being trained to do? (2) Within the category of jobs 
that claimants are reasonably capable of performing, are 
there jobs reasonably available in the community for which 
claimants are able to compete and which they could 
realistically and likely procure? 
72
 See, New Orleans (Gulfwide) Stevedores v. Turner. 661 F.2d 1031 (Fifth 
Cir. 1981). 
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The second question in effect requires a determination 
of whether there exists a reasonable likelihood, given the 
claimants' age, education and vocational background, that 
they would be hired if they diligently sought the job. If 
alternate jobs exist which the claimants could reasonably 
perform and secure had they diligently tried, the employer, 
after demonstrating the existence of such jobs, has met its 
burden. 
Job availability should depend on whether there is a 
reasonable opportunity for claimants to compete in a manner 
normally pursued by persons genuinely seeking work with 
their determined capabilities. If it is established that 
there are jobs which the claimants can realistically perform 
and secure, there may not be a finding of total permanent 
disability. : The employer's burden of demonstrating that 
claimants are able to secure employment simply cannot amount 
to a requirement that the employer either hire the claimants 
or find them a guaranteed job. "The employer does not have 
to lead the claimant to water, only establish that water is 
nearby which the claimant may drink if he reaches for it." 
Id. 
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Intracorp found there are jobs which Petitioner 
Hoskings could do if he genuinely sought work with his 
capabilities. It was not unreasonable for the Commission to 
rely on the Intracorp report combined with the other facts 
surrounding Petitioner Hoskings' retirement and work history 
and the medical evidence to conclude that there was regular 
work available to him. Since there is work available to 
Petitioner Hoskings, the Commission is correct in finding 
that he is not permanently totally disabled. 
POINT II. 
THE ISSUE OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY 
BENEFITS WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COMMISSION. 
Petitioner Hoskings argues that, in the alternative, 
the Commission should have awarded him permanent partial 
disability benefits. Based upon the pleadings and the 
l 
hearings, the issue was narrowed to whether Petitioner 
Hoskings was entitled to permanent total disability. 
Neither the Commission nor the ALJ reviewed evidence 
regarding permanent partial impairment. There is 
conflicting medical information regarding permanent partial 
impairment which will require further hearings before the 
ALJ, a medical panel and ultimately the Commission. 
76
 R. at 254. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the Commission's 
decision should be affirmed because there is substantial 
evidence to support its finding that Petitioner Hoskings is 
not permanently totally disabled. Since the issue of 
permanent partial impairment was not before the Commission 
and the ALJ, a separate action must be commenced by 
Petitioner Hoskings. Regardless, the issue of permanent 
partial disability is not before this Court. 
DATED this l^> day of J^^^</W^^^~- / 1995. 
FRANK M. NAKAMURA 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake City 
Corporation 
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EXHIBIT_A 
3'k-75 MUa/ifc 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
WARREN HOSKINGS, * 
* ORDER GRANTING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
vs. * 
* 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, * 
Defendant. * Case No. 90-0401 
Salt Lake City Corporation asks The Industrial Commission of 
Utah to review an Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding 
permanent total disability compensation to Warren Hoskings under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Beginning in 1966, Mr. Hoskings worked for Salt Lake City as 
a fireman. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1974, then captain in 
the early 1980's. 
While fighting a fire in 1980, Mr. Hoskings injured his left 
ankle. He underwent surgery, but continued to experience pain. On 
April 6, 1986, in the course of his employment, he reinjured his 
left ankle. He received medical attention the next day and was 
diagnosed with an acute ankle sprain and "calcaneus/cuboid joint 
problem, ff later additionally diagnosed as "traumatic 
osteoarthritis". 
Mr. Hoskings did not miss any work as a result of the April 
1986 injury. However, he experienced chronic pain and difficulty 
walking. He was examined by a number of different physicians who 
attempted various conservative remedies without producing any 
significant improvement. 
On September 1, 1988, Mr. Hoskings accepted early retirement 
from Salt Lake City. There is no indication that Mr. Hoskings' 
work performance was unsatisfactory prior to his retirement, nor is 
there any evidence Mr. Hoskings informed Salt Lake City that his 
decision to retire was related to his ankle injury. However, Mr. 
Hoskings now claims that his decision to retire was motivated by 
his ankle injury. 
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Mr. Hoskings' impairment from his ankle injury has been rated 
by several doctors in a range from 8% to 17% of the whole person. 
The doctors also agree the injury causes Mr. Hoskings significant 
pain and limits the mobility of the ankle. 
After retiring, Mr. Hoskings worked as fire marshall for 
Hamilton Stores in Yellowstone Park during the summers of 1990 and 
1991. Mr. Hoskings spent a substantial amount of his work day 
driving from one store to another. He had no difficulty performing 
the duties of the job. However, he chose to resign when the job 
was changed to a year-around position because he believed the cold 
winter temperatures in Yellowstone might aggravate his ankle injury 
as well as a nonindustrial pulmonary condition. 
At the time of his injury, Mr. Hoskings was 50 years old. He 
is of above average intelligence and performs well on vocational 
aptitude tests. He has completed a one-year technical program in 
electronics and two years of university education. He has work 
experience in electronics, as well as eight years experience with 
the National Guard in transportation and supply services. 
Two vocational rehabilitation studies have been performed on 
Mr. Hoskings. The first was conducted by the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services (ffDRSfI) and concludes that Mr. Hoskings 
cannot be rehabilitated. The second was conducted at Salt Lake 
City's request by Intracorp and concludes that Mr. Hoskings is a 
suitable candidate for rehabilitation. The Intracorp study also 
identifies work available throughout Utah which Mr. Hoskings can 
perform. For reasons set forth below, the Industrial Commission 
finds the Intracorp report to be persuasive on the issues of Mr. 
Hoskings7 suitability for rehabilitation and the availability of 
alternative work. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The ALJ has applied the correct framework in considering Mr. 
Hoskings' claim for permanent total disability compensation. 
First, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Hoskings7 industrial accident 
caused the ankle injury which is now claimed to render him 
disabled. The ALJ then applied the "odd-lot" doctrine to determine 
whether Mr. Hoskings was permanently and totally disabled. 
The odd lot doctrine is a three part test. Mr. Hoskings must 
first prove that his ankle injury prevents him from returning to 
his former occupation. Then he must demonstrate that he cannot be 
rehabilitated. If Mr. Hoskings is successful in establishing these 
two factors, the burden shifts to Salt Lake City to prove that 
other work is available to Mr. Hoskings despite his injury. 
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While the Industrial Commission agrees with the analytical 
framework applied by the ALJ to Mr* Hoskings' claim, the Industrial 
Commission does not agree with the ALJ's conclusions on two points: 
First, the Industrial Commission finds that Mr. Hoskings can be 
rehabilitated. Second, the Industrial Commission finds that other 
work is available that Mr. Hoskings can perform, despite his ankle 
injury. 
On the issue of Mr. Hoskings' ability to be rehabilitated, the 
Industrial Commission has carefully reviewed the DRS report, which 
concludes that Mr. Hoskings was "unable to demonstrate the stamina 
and endurance needed to work in full-time employment." However, 
the report makes no distinction between sedentary work and more 
strenuous employment. It does not address the fact that Mr. 
Hoskings' employment at Hamilton Stores demonstrated some ability 
to work. It makes no reference to Mr. Hoskings' intelligence, 
education, adaptability, or wide range of prior work experience. 
The Industrial Commission has also reviewed the deposition of Mr. 
Miera, a rehabilitation counselor with DRS, but Mr. Miera's 
testimony adds little to support the DRS report. 
In contrast to the DRS report, the Intracorp report identifies 
Mr. Hoskings' training, experience and abilities. It specifically 
addresses the effects of Mr. Hoskings' ankle injury and other 
medical conditions. The Intracorp report then analyzes the 
foregoing factors and concludes that Mr. Hoskings can be 
rehabilitated. Intracorp's conclusion is corroborated by the fact 
that Mr. Hoskings found other work at Hamilton Stores and 
successfully performed his employment duties there. The Industrial 
Commission is persuaded by Intracorp's objective data and 
subjective analysis. 
Although Mr. Hoskings can be rehabilitated and therefore fails 
to meet the second element of the odd lot doctrine, the Industrial 
Commission will consider the third element of the odd lot doctrine. 
This third element requires Salt Lake City to show that other work 
is available to Mr. Hoskings. 
The Intracorp report contains a detailed list and discussion 
of employment opportunities within Mr. Hoskings' abilities. Such 
employment opportunities exist primarily in the Salt Lake 
metropolitan area, but also are present throughout Utah. The 
record contains no significant evidence contradicting the Intracorp 
report on this point. Consequently, the Industrial Commission 
finds that regular, dependable employment is available within Mr. 
Hoskings' abilities. 
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In summary, the Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ that 
Mr. Hoskings' industrial accident caused his ankle injury and that 
he cannot return t<? work as a fire fighter. However, contrary to 
the ALJ's decision, the Industrial Commission finds that Mr. 
Hoskings can be rehabilitated and that regular, dependable work is 
available to 1dm in otliex branches oi tlie labor market. The 
Industrial Commission therefore concludes that Mr. Hoskings is not 
entitled to permanent total disability compensation within the 
meaning of §35-1-67 of the Utah Workers7 Compensation Act. 
In light of the Industrial Commission's determination that Mr. 
Hoskings is not entitled to permanent total disability 
compensation, it is unnecessary to address Mr. Hoskings' argument 
regarding the date on which compensation should begin. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission reverses the ALJ's decision in this 
matter and hereby denies Mr. Hoskings claim for permanent total 
disability compensation. It is so ordered. 
Dated this3^±^day of March, 1995. 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this 
Order. 
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35-1-67 LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Vocational rehabilitation — Proce-
dure and payments. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66%% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of \he injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the siate average weekly wage at the time of the iryury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 
18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed 
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not 
to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier be required to pay weekly compensation 
payments for more than 312 weeks. A finding by the commission of perma-
nent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such 
time as the following proceedings have been had: If the employee has tenta-
tively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be manda-
tory that the industrial commission of Utah refer the employee to the divi-
sion of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education for 
rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the commission to order 
paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the 
rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training 
of the employee shall generally follow the practice applicable under 
§ 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having combined in-
juries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of 
education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that the, 
employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabilitation 
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there 
be paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 662/3% of his average 
weekly wages at the time of the iryury, but not more than a maximum of 
85% of the state average Weekly wage at the |;ime of the injury per week 
and not less than ft minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the'employee at the tirqe of the injury, but not to exceed 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out 
of the second iryury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such 
period of time beginning with the time that the payments, as in this section 
provided, to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and 
ending with the death of the employee. No employee shall be entitled to 
any such benefits if he fails or refuses to cooperate with the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under this section. 
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All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to 
benefits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), includ-
ing those injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than $120 
per week when paid only by the second injury fund, or when combined with 
compensation payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The divi-
sion of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational 
training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the 
work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission 
shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, deter-
mine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sus-
tained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, consti-
tutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the 
provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disa-
bility is required in those instances. In all other cases where there has been 
rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the 
award shall be based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
§§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 
312 weeks. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, $ 78; C.L. 1917, ment) and near the end of the fourth para-
( 3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, graph (deleted by the 1977 amendment); and 
42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, substituted "July 1, 1975" for "July 1, 1974" 
|3l; C. 1943, 42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, 5 1; in the fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 
1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. amendment). 
57,'§ 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 sub-
1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. stituted "spouse" for "wife" in the first para-
68, 5 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 5; graph. 
1971, ch. 76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch. The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
13, § lj 1975, ch. 101, § 5; 1977, ch. 150, the same changes as the 1977 amendment by 
S*l; 1977, ch. 151, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 6; chapter 151; combined the first two para-
1979, chi 138, § 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, graphs into one paragraph; inserted the see-
ch. 356, § 1; 1985, ch. 160, § 1. ond paragraph; and deleted the former third 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amend- and fourth paragraphs which read: "Com-
ment substituted "85% of the state average mencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are 
weekly wage" for "662/3% of the state average permanently and totally disabled and on that 
weekly wage" four times in the first para- date or prior thereto were receiving compen-
graph and once in the last paragraph; in- sation benefits from the special fund provided 
creased the minimum benefit per week from for by section 35-1-68(1) shall be paid com-
$36* to $45 in the first paragraph; inserted pensation benefits at the rate of $60 per 
"not to exceed the average weekly wage of week. 
the employee at the time of the injury" twice "Commencing July 1,1975, all persons who 
(n the. first paragraph; increased the benefit were permanently and totally disabled on or 
per * week from $50 to $60 at the end of the before March 5, 1949, and were receiving 
third paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amend- compensation benefits and continue to re-
69 
EXHIBITS 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-16 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings, 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990, ment, effective April 23,1990, added the excep-
ch. 132, § 1. tion at the end of Subsection (l)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re 
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert. 
Final agency action. denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Function of district court. The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily 
Right to judicial proceeding. delegated to the district court is to review in-
Cited, formal agency adjudicative proceedings. State 
„. , ^ v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 
Final agency action.
 1 9 9 0 )
 K J
* ™ 
Industrial Commission's determination of 
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not Right to judicial proceeding. 
reviewable under this section, because the District court erred in declining a de novo 
commission and the parties had not resolved review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reci-
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and procity, where there had been no proceeding on 
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale his application that was sufficiently judicial in 
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
App. 1992). agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hear-
•, .. . . . , . . . ing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Pro-
™ ? o n ® f * i ? V ^ C ° U r h >u • i, r , Sessional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
 A 1 9 9 1 ) * 
agency decisions through formal adjudicative 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
the district court will no longer function as in- 233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah 
termediate appellate court except to review in- State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct. 
formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu- App. 1993). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
eview of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agenc>*s prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-16, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Agency action. 
Applicability of section. 
Arbitrary action. 
Conflicting evidence. 
Factual findings. 
Final order. 
Function of district court. 
Jurisdictional hearing by board. 
Prior practice. 
Review. 
Standard of review. 
—Interpretation of statutory term. 
—Questions of law. 
Substantial evidence test. 
Substantial prejudice. 
Whole record test. 
Cited. 
Agency action. 
Whether the Industrial Commission acted 
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsec-
tion (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Applicability of section. 
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not 
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of 
deference an appellate court grants to an 
agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief 
should not be granted when, although the 
agency committed error, the error was harm-
less. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Arbitrary action. 
Industrial commission's denial of occupa-
tional disease disability benefits based upon a 
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of 
causation failed to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and there-
fore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v. 
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
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